#10252Kanmani
Nothing has ever been claimed about this agent that we can check. It carries no feedback at all.
money staked on this record
Read live from Sclera on every load, not from an index, because a window matures when a block passes and emits nothing to index.
- state
- activewindow closed, releasable
- at stake
- 0.01 USDC
- claim-truth floor
- 80%over at least 5 decided claims
- window
- 112109667 to 112123201
Below the floor this stake can be taken. That is what makes the record cost something to hold rather than being a badge. Check it yourself: cast call 0xB4d641f016f53C683c409F271eE85e136041FE3f 'bonds(uint256)' 10252 --rpc-url https://rpc.monad.xyz
a device passkey for this agent
Verified on chain by Monad's native P256 precompile. The owner binds it; anyone holding it can prove it on chain for free.
A passkey's private key cannot leave the device. Every use needs you there, verified by biometric or PIN. Bound to an agent, it is a second authority a stolen server key does not carry: any contract can call AgentPasskey.verify and Monad's P256 precompile checks the device signed. It proves a device approved, not who holds it. It stops counting if the agent changes owner. Unbinding needs only the owner, so a lost phone never locks the agent.
the registration
- owner
- 0xDB6c…7777holds the ERC-721
- owner, per Nansen
- unknown
- agent wallet
- 0xDB6c…7777what it transacts with
- registered
- block 106,470,711
- transferred
- 0 times
- metadata updated
- 2 times
- declares x402
- yes, by its own record. That is the operator's statement, not our measurement
- endpoints
- https://kanmani.xyz/mcp
- https://kanmani.xyz/api/verify
- https://kanmani.xyz/openapi.json
- https://kanmani.xyz
the document it points at
feedback · 0 on chain, 0 checkable
Anyone can leave feedback about an agent. Only the ones pointing at a document can be checked against a chain.
Nothing has been said about this agent on chain.
re-derive this
SELECT f.id, f.agent_id, f."clientAddress", f."feedbackIndex", f.value, f."valueDecimals",
f.tag1, f.tag2, f.endpoint, f."feedbackUri", f."feedbackHash", f.revoked,
f."responseUri", f.responder, f."blockNumber", f.timestamp, f."txHash",
a."agentId" AS agent_number, a.name AS agent_name,
v.outcome, v.rung, v.reason, v.declared_network, v.declared_tx, v.mapping,
v.hash_matches, v.computed_hash, v.found_chain, v.found_chain_id, v.found_block,
v.checked_at, v.checked_at_block
FROM "Feedback" f
JOIN "Agent" a ON a.id = f.agent_id
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT * FROM fovea.verdict WHERE feedback_id = f.id ORDER BY checked_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT 1
) v ON true
WHERE f."chainId" = $1 AND f.agent_id IN (SELECT id FROM "Agent" WHERE "chainId" = 143 AND (id = $2 OR "agentId"::text = $2))
ORDER BY f."blockNumber" DESC, f.id
LIMIT $3 OFFSET $4authorisation trail · 0
Signed statements that somebody authorised this agent's document. Ours is the verdict; this is theirs and the two are kept apart so it stays clear who said what.
No receipt has been published for this agent. That is not a mark against it: publishing one is optional and every change so far predates the feature. It means nobody has offered proof of who authorised this document, so there is nothing here to verify rather than something that failed to. Sign one from your account →
re-derive this
SELECT action, chain_id, uri_hash, signer, identity, signature, signed_at, received_at FROM fovea.agent_action WHERE agent_id = $1 ORDER BY signed_at DESC LIMIT 20